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THE DOCTRINE OF QUASI-MUTUAL ASSENT - HAS IT BECOME THE 
GENERAL RULE FOR THE FORMATION OF CONTRACTS? THE CASE OF 
PILLAY v SHAIK 2009 4 SA 74 (SCA) 
 
P Thejane (Rankoane) 
 
 1 Introduction 
 
The doctrine of quasi-mutual assent is undoubtedly part of our law and has been 
affirmed and applied in a number of leading decisions.1 Its necessity and significance 
has also been acknowledged by legal professionals. As one writer puts it:2  
 
…without it our law would be in a very sorry state, as it would be obliged to hold that 
whenever there was no true subjective agreement there was no contract, even if the 
one party had led the other reasonably to understand that they were in agreement. 
 
The recognition by our courts is evident in the following statement made by Davis J 
in Irvan and Johnson (SA) Ltd v Kaplaan:3 
 
If this were not so, it is difficult to see how commerce could proceed at all. All kinds 
of mental reservations, of careless unilateral mistakes, of unexpressed conditions 
and the like, would become relevant and no party to any contract would be safe: the 
door would be opened wide to uncertainty and even to fraud.4 
 
The application of the doctrine of quasi-mutual assent in the case of Pillay v Shaik5 
prompted the writing of this note. This note questions the application of the doctrine 
of quasi-mutual assent to resolve the dispute in the Pillay v Shaik case and offers 
some recommendations firstly on how the Supreme Court of Appeal should have 
resolved the dispute, and secondly on what would possibly have justified the 
                                                          
  Puseletso Thejane (Rankoane). BA (National University of Lesotho), LLB, LLM (Wits). Lecturer of 
Law, University of the Witwatersrand. Attorney and Notary Public of the High Court of South 
Africa.  Email: Puseletso.Thejane@wits.ac.za. 
1  These include Van Ryn Wine and Spirit Co v Chandos Bar 1928 TPD 417; George v Fairmead 
(Pty) Ltd 1958 2 SA 465 (A); Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 3 SA 978 (A); 
Sonap Petroleum (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 3 SA 234 (A); and HNR Properties CC v 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2004 4 SA 471 (SCA). 
2  See Christie Law of Contract 11-12. 
3  Irvan and Johnson (SA) Ltd v Kaplaan 1940 CPD 647.  
4  Irvan and Johnson (SA) Ltd v Kaplaan 1940 CPD 647 651. 
5  Pillay v Shaik 2009 4 SA 74 (SCA). 
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application of the doctrine of quasi-mutual assent. A brief account of the doctrine of 
quasi-mutual assent is given as it lays a foundation for the main contentions made. 
 
2 Background 
 
The doctrine of quasi-mutual assent (hereinafter referred to as "the doctrine") is one 
of the three theories for the formation of contracts in our law, and a compromise 
between the other two, being the will and declaration theories.6 Also known as the 
reliance theory, the doctrine has its origins in English law and can be traced to as far 
back as 1848. The doctrine was formulated in the English case of Freeman v 
Cooke,7 but made popular by the following statement made by Blackburne J in Smith 
v Hughes:8  
 
If, whatever a man's real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a 
reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed by the 
other party, and that other party upon that belief enters into the contract with him, 
the man thus conducting himself would be equally bound as if he had intended to 
agree to the other party's terms.9 
 
The doctrine is meant to aid in resolving disputes on the existence of an 
agreement.10 It firstly acknowledges that the general principle for the formation of 
valid contracts is that there must be a meeting of the minds of the parties or 
subjective consensus.11 Thus, the primary basis of liability in contract law is the 
expressed will of the parties.12 It further concedes that there are instances where 
confusion could arise as to whether there has been a meeting of the minds or not, 
because one of the parties may have an intention different from that of the other 
party, but fail to communicate this intention.13 Its essence is, therefore, that since 
contractual liability is based on the parties' subjective intention, and since it can be 
difficult for the one party to read the other's mind, there should, in such instances, be 
an alternative basis for determining a party's liability. Consequently, where there is 
                                                          
6  Hutchison (ed) Law of Contract 16. 
7  Freeman v Cooke (1848) 2 Ex 654. 
8  Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597. 
9  Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597 607. 
10  See Du Bois (ed) Wille's Principles 737. 
11  See Christie Law of Contract 24 and Kahn Contract and Mercantile Law. 
12  Christie Law of Contract 11-12. 
13  See Hutchison (ed) Law of Contract 90. 
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dissensus which is not readily apparent, the party that acted contrary to the 
subjective consensus should be held bound to the apparent agreement. The doctrine 
thus protects parties who would otherwise not be able to dispute the other 
contracting party's denial of their "true" intention, and who would as a result be left 
destitute.14 This is because the doctrine refers to the surrounding circumstances to 
determine the disputing party's intention. 
 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Pillay v Shaik raises two very 
important issues which impinge on two principles of the law of contract. In the first 
place, it foregrounds the interplay between subjective consensus and the prescribed 
mode of acceptance of an offer and/or self-imposed formalities and the question of 
which should override, where the parties had clearly agreed on these for the valid 
formation of a contract but subsequently disregarded them. That is, it brings to the 
fore the question of whether the courts must give effect to the substance or form of 
the contract. The answer to this enquiry finds its justification in one of the 
fundamental principles of contract law, namely freedom of contract. Secondly, the 
judgment highlights the misconception of the role of the doctrine of quasi-mutual 
assent in our law.  
 
The purpose in this analysis is to review the appropriateness of the Supreme Court 
of Appeal's application of the doctrine to the facts of Pillay v Shaik. The note starts 
by discussing the Pillay v Shaik case and then proceeds to a two-fold analysis of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal's judgment.  It does this firstly by criticizing the Supreme 
Court of Appeal's decision to base its finding on the doctrine. Secondly, it criticises 
the court's factual finding itself on the grounds that it was based on the wrong 
application of the principle to the facts of the case. The note then goes on to propose 
the approach that the Supreme Court of Appeal should have followed in deciding the 
case.  
  
                                                          
14  Irvan and Johnson (SA) Ltd v Kaplaan 1940 CPD 647 651. 
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3  Pillay v Shaik 
 
3.1 Case discussion 
 
In this case the two buyers sought an order declaring that the agreements of sale 
they allegedly concluded with the sellers were of full force and effect. The alleged 
agreements were for the purchase of a member's interest in the close corporations 
which held ownership of certain units in a sectional title scheme developed by the 
sellers. The sellers had drawn up standard form agreements for completion by 
potential buyers. They had then appointed as their attorneys the ninth respondent, 
Mooney Ford, a firm of attorneys. When the buyers had decided to buy into the 
development they signed separately the standard form agreements, thereby making 
firm offers to purchase. Subsequently, with the consent of Mooney Ford, the buyers 
paid their deposits, the receipt of which was acknowledged. Later on Mooney Ford 
requested the buyers to furnish them with guarantees for the remainder of the 
purchase prices, which they did. All of the above acts took place without the buyers 
being aware that the sellers had not yet signed the purported agreements.  
 
The sellers denied the existence of the alleged agreement on the basis that the 
alleged offers to purchase had not been signed on their behalf and the offers had 
therefore not been accepted. In support of their defence they relied among others on 
clauses 5.1 and 8 of the contract, which provided for the payment of deposits by the 
buyers to Mooney Ford and the provision by the sellers to Mooney Ford of certain 
documents in trust subsequent to the signing of the agreement by the parties. They 
further argued that they had not signed the execution clause of the written contracts. 
 
The Durban High Court ruled in favour of the buyers. It applied the doctrine and 
found the agreement to be valid. The sellers then appealed against the decision to 
the Full Bench of the Pietermaritzburg High Court. The Full Bench found in favour of 
the sellers, and held that since the alleged agreements of sale had not been signed 
on behalf of the sellers they were not binding. In doing so the Full Bench interpreted 
the clauses in question as imposing the reduction of the agreement to writing as a 
formality without which the agreement could not come into existence. Consequently, 
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the Full Bench found it unnecessary to consider the question of whether, on the 
application of the doctrine, the alleged agreements could be said to be binding. The 
buyers appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal disagreed with the decision of the Full Bench that the 
parties had intended for the purported agreement to be valid and binding only when 
reduced to writing.15 It stated that where an agreement does not in law have to be in 
writing, as was the situation in Pillay v Shaik, such an agreement will have binding 
force unless the parties agree beforehand that writing constitutes a formality. Finding 
that no such prior agreement had been concluded in this case, it stated that the 
finding of the Full Bench could not be upheld. The Supreme Court of Appeal held 
that the correct interpretation of the contract was that the offers prescribed a 
particular form of acceptance. Upon finding that the sellers had clearly not complied 
with the prescribed mode of acceptance,16 the Supreme Court of Appeal went on to 
consider if there was an alternative basis on which it could declare the alleged 
agreement to be binding. This is evident from the following statement:17 
 
This raises the question as to whether the doctrine of quasi-mutual assent can be 
applied in circumstances where acceptance does not take place in accordance with 
a prescribed mode but the conduct of the offeree is such as to induce a reasonable 
belief on the part of the offeror that the offer has been duly accepted according to 
the prescribed mode. Viewed in the light of basic principle, the question must surely 
be answered in the affirmative because the considerations underlying the 
application of the reliance theory apply as strongly in a case such as the present as 
they do in cases where no mode of acceptance is prescribed and the 
misrepresentation by the offeree relates solely to the fact that there is no 
consensus.  
 
Having decided to invoke the doctrine, the Supreme Court of Appeal proceeded to 
consider its application to the facts. It stated that the critical question to ask is 
whether the party whose actual intention did not conform to the declared intention 
led the other party, as a reasonable man, to believe that his declared intention 
represented his actual intention.18 The answer to this question, the court said, 
necessitates a three-fold enquiry, namely: firstly, was there a misrepresentation as to 
                                                          
15  Pillay v Shaik 2009 4 SA 74 (SCA) para 50.  
16  Pillay v Shaik 2009 4 SA 74 (SCA) para 52.   
17  Pillay v Shaik 2009 4 SA 74 (SCA) para 53.   
18  Pillay v Shaik 2009 4 SA 74 (SCA) para 55. 
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the intention of one of the partyies; secondly, who made that representation; and 
thirdly, was the other party misled thereby? The last question, the court said, should 
be divided into two separate questions, namely: firstly, was the other party misled; 
and secondly, would a reasonable man (in his position) have been misled? 
 
In applying this test to the facts of the case the court concluded that the sellers 
(whose actual intention did not conform to the declared intention) had, through their 
agent Mooney Ford, including their sending of the various letters to the buyers, 
misrepresented their actual intention and led the buyers, as reasonable men, to 
believe that their declared intention represented their actual intention; further, that 
these acts were a clear acceptance by the sellers of the buyers' offers.19 The court 
accordingly held that the alleged agreements were valid and binding on the sellers 
and ordered them to effect transfer of the said units. 
 
3.2 Analysis of the judgment in Pillay v Shaik 
 
It is disagreed here with the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in two 
respects. The main contention is based on the court's employment of the doctrine in 
this case. In the second leg of the analysis the focus shifts to the application of the 
principle to the facts of the case. 
 
3.2.1  Incorrect appeal to the doctrine of quasi mutual-assent 
 
The main argument being put forward in this note is that the dispute in the case of 
Pillay v Shaik rested on compliance with the prescribed mode and/or formalities for 
acceptance. The court's logic to resolve this inquiry via the application of the doctrine 
was thus incorrect. In other words, the Supreme Court of Appeal should have 
resolved the case solely on the question of whether there had been compliance, 
without invoking the doctrine.  
 
                                                          
19  Pillay v Shaik 2009 4 SA 74 (SCA) para 58. 
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In order for a valid contract to come into existence, the parties thereto must reach 
consensus.20 That is, there must be a meeting of the minds regarding the conclusion 
of a legally binding agreement between them.21 The agreement must be expressed 
by the concerned parties and this can take any form. Thus, the expression can be 
made verbally, in writing or by conduct. Since it can be difficult to establish with 
certainty that such consensus has been reached, the law of contract requires that 
the expression of consensus be done through the process of offer and acceptance. 
 
An offer is an invitation by one person (the offeror) to another person (the offeree) 
with the intention to create legally binding obligations between them.22 An 
acceptance would then be the affirmative reply of the offeree to the offeror's offer 
with the intention to create legally binding obligations on the terms set out in the 
offer.23  
 
Acceptance must also comply with certain requirements in order for it to be valid. 
Firstly, the acceptance must be made with animus contrahendi by the person to 
whom it was addressed (the offeree).24 Secondly, it must correspond to the exact 
terms of the offer, failing which it becomes a counter-offer.25 Thirdly, the acceptance 
must be communicated to the offeror.26 The communication of acceptance can take 
any form, except where the offeror has prescribed a particular method of 
acceptance, in which case the acceptance must be made in the prescribed manner 
in order for an agreement to come into existence.27 Lastly, to be effective it must take 
place before the offer terminates.28  
 
                                                          
20  See Bhana, Bonthuys and Nortje Students' Guide 24. 
21  Bhana, Bonthuys and Nortje Students' Guide 24. 
22  See Sharrock Business Transactions Law 53. 
23  Van der Merwe et al Contract 54.  
24  See Bloom v American Swiss Watch Company 1915 AD 100. 
25  See Lee v American Swiss Watch Company 1914 AD 121; JRM Furniture Holdings v Cowlin 
1983 4 SA 541 (W); and Boerne v Harris 1949 1 SA 793 (A). 
26  Kahn Contract and Mercantile Law 111. 
27  See in this regard Bloom v American Swiss Watch Company 1915 AD 100; R v Nel 1921 AD 
339; Mackenzie v Farmer's Co-operative Meat Industries Ltd 1922 AD 16; Laws v Rutherfurd 
1924 AD 261; and Driftwood Properties (Pty) Ltd v McLean 1971 3 SA 591 (A). 
28  Bhana, Bonthuys and Nortje Students' Guide 41 and Bloom v American Swiss Watch Company 
1915 AD 100 105.   
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That the offers by the buyers were valid was not in dispute. The bone of contention 
was whether or not there had been a valid acceptance by the sellers, since they had 
not followed the stipulated method of acceptance, namely signature. It is submitted, 
therefore, that the dispute arose from the third requirement for a valid acceptance, 
namely the manner of acceptance.  
 
It is a general rule that acceptance must be communicated or be brought to the 
knowledge of the offeror.29 Nevertheless, the offeror can dispense with this rule by 
authorising or prescribing another method of acceptance.30 The Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Pillay v Shaik interpreted the facts to mean that writing had been 
prescribed as a method of acceptance,31 which interpretation I support, based on the 
reasons that follow. Although the court held that the buyers had prescribed signature 
as the method of acceptance, it nevertheless considered if, on the application of the 
doctrine, a valid agreement could be said to have come into existence. This creates 
the impression that there was a misunderstanding on the part of the court between 
prescribed and authorised methods of acceptance. A clear distinction is and must be 
drawn between these two concepts.  
 
A "prescribed" method of acceptance constitutes the only method of acceptance 
which is capable of giving rise to an agreement. Thus, acceptance must take place in 
the prescribed manner in order for the agreement to come into existence.32 The 
offeror can prescribe a method expressly or impliedly.33 "Authorised", on the other 
hand, means that the method used by the offeror is preferred, but if the offeree uses 
a different method of acceptance the contract is valid provided this is brought to the 
attention of the offeror.34  
 
                                                          
29  Bhana, Bonthuys and Nortje Students' Guide 41. 
30  See fn 29 above. 
31  Pillay v Shaik 2009 4 SA 74 (SCA) para 52. 
32  See in this regard Bloom v American Swiss Watch Company 1915 AD 100; R v Nel 1921 AD 
339; Mackenzie v Farmer's Co-operative Meat Industries Ltd 1922 AD 16; Laws v Rutherfurd 
1924 AD 261; and Driftwood Properties (Pty) Ltd v McLean 1971 3 SA 591 (A). 
33  Bloom v American Swiss Company 1915 AD 100 103.  
34  See Eliason v Henshaw (1819) 4 Wheaton 225.  
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The question of whether the offeror intended to prescribe a specific method of 
acceptance must be determined by reference to all the facts of a case.35 These 
include, amongst others, the existence of an execution clause, the declaration that 
the contract be concluded upon signature, the form and the commercial nature of the 
contract to be concluded and the geographical separation of the parties.36  
 
In the case of Pillay v Shaik the factors to be taken into account are, firstly, the 
existence of the execution clause. This indicates that the sellers were meant to sign 
the form. Furthermore, clauses 5.1 and 8 provided for the payment of the deposits by 
the buyers to Mooney Ford and the delivery by the sellers of certain documents to 
Mooney Ford in trust pending the buyers' payment of the balance of the purchase 
price, respectively, within a certain period of time after the date of signature of the 
agreement by the parties. This can be construed as a clear declaration by the buyers 
that the agreements would be concluded only upon signature by both parties. This 
was clearly not the situation in this case as the sellers had not signed the purported 
agreement. Lastly, clause 15 (the whole agreement clause) indicates that the 
purported agreement was not intended to be of full force and effect unless signed by 
both parties. This argument finds support in Snyman J's statement to the effect that if 
on the purported agreement it appears that the parties intended the document to be 
the very agreement between them (that is, that the parties intended that writing 
should symbolise the agreement), then such a document must be signed for the 
agreement to come into existence.37  
 
It has already been stated that the consequences of failing to comply with the 
prescribed method of acceptance is that no contract comes into existence. The 
cases in this area have been consistent in applying or affirming this principle. A few 
of these cases are briefly discussed below to illustrate the court's attitude in each. 
 
  
                                                          
35  See Van der Merwe et al Contract 54. 
36   See Van der Merwe et al Contract 68. 
37  Meter Motors (Pty) Ltd v Cohen 1966 2 SA 735 (T) 737B or 737H. 
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In Driftwood Properties v Van Aswegen38 clause 7 of the offer read: 
 
…this offer is open and binding upon both parties until signature by both parties (on 
or) before 17 May, 1969, failing which it shall lapse if only signed by one party. 
 
The court held that clause 7 clearly indicated that the offeror intended the contract to 
be concluded upon mere signature of the document by the offeree.39 In other words, 
the offeror prescribed signature as the method of acceptance and dispensed with the 
need for communication of the acceptance to him. 
 
The court held that the principle stands, unless there was doubt that a method of 
acceptance has been prescribed by the offeror, in which case there is a presumption 
that a contract will come into existence only when the offeror becomes aware of the 
offeree's acceptance.40  
 
The same principle was upheld by the court in Goldblatt v Freemantle.41 There the 
court held that writing had been prescribed as a formality for the formation of the 
contract and found the "contract" to be invalid due to failure by the offeror to sign. 
The court did not invoke the doctrine of quasi-mutual assent even though the offeror 
had already started to supply the goods which formed the subject matter of the 
contract. 
 
In Laws v Rutherfurd42 the court confirmed the principle that a prescribed method of 
compliance must be complied with for a valid agreement to come into existence, and 
said it stood unless evidence is furnished to establish the waiver of the prescribed 
manner by the offeror.43 The most important aspect of this case lies in its similarity 
with the facts of Pillay v Shaik, in that in both cases certain acts were performed by 
the contract deniers before acceptance in the prescribed manner. It could be argued 
that these acts were misleading, and could be read as an indication that a contract 
had been created. However, this argument cannot validly be extended to the 
                                                          
38  Driftwood Properties (Pty) Ltd v McLean 1971 3 SA 591 (A). 
39  Driftwood Properties (Pty) Ltd v McLean 1971 3 SA 591 (A) 598A.  
40  Driftwood Properties (Pty) Ltd v McLean 1971 3 SA 591 (A) 597. 
41  Goldblatt v Freemantle 1920 AD 123. 
42  Laws v Rutherfurd 1924 AD 261. 
43  Laws v Rutherfurd 1924 AD 261 262.   
P THEJANE(RANKOANE)                                                                    PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
525 / 638 
 
scenarios in Laws v Rutherfurd and Pillay v Shaik. It is astounding, therefore, that 
the courts in these two cases arrived at different outcomes, Laws v Rutherfurd 
finding the various acts therein irrelevant and that no valid agreement had been 
formed, and Pillay v Shaik taking these into consideration and finding that a valid 
agreement had been created. 
 
More importantly, the court stated that where parties deliberately entered into a 
contract on certain terms, they must be held to those contracts even if that led to 
hardship, and that the courts must not make new contracts for the parties.44 This 
statement is broad enough to include an assertion that where parties have agreed on 
a prescribed method of acceptance and/or formalities they must be held to such 
even if the law does not require them for an agreement to come into existence. 
Moreover, the statement is in accordance with the principle in SA Sentrale Ko-
operatiewe Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren45 and Brisley v Drotsky.46 The general 
principle in these cases is that holding the parties to self-imposed formalities gives 
effect to the principle of freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda. Although 
these two cases dealt with self-imposed formalities for the variation of agreements, it 
is argued that the underlying principle relating to the consequences of non-
compliance applies in the same way in the context of self-imposed formalities and/or 
where a method of acceptance for the formation of contracts has been prescribed. 
 
According to this underlying principle of our contract law, parties are free to choose if 
they want to contract, with whom and on what terms.47 This accords with another 
founding principle of the law of contract, namely the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, 
according to which contracts should be upheld and enforced by all means possible.48 
According to this principle, the courts should interfere only where contracts were not 
freely entered into, such as contracts induced by duress, misrepresentation, undue 
influence, or where the terms of a contract are immoral, illegal and contrary to public 
policy. 
 
                                                          
44  Laws v Rutherfurd 1924 AD 261 264.   
45  SA Sentrale Ko-operatiewe Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren 1964 4 SA 760 (A). 
46  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA). 
47  Hutchison (ed) Law of Contract 23. 
48  See Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 1 SA 776 (A). 
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The principle of freedom of contract can thus be limited in appropriate 
circumstances. There are certain situations in which interference by the state, 
including the courts, is justified. For example, contracts must comply with the 
provisions of the Constitution,49 while other state involvement in the form, for 
instance, of the National Credit Act50 and the Consumer Protection Act51 is warranted 
to some extent by the aim of protecting the vulnerable in contracts in which there are 
inequalities in the bargaining power. Nonetheless, it should be borne in mind that 
contract law still remains predominantly a branch of private law and freedom of 
contract a fundamental principle.  
 
If the Supreme Court of Appeal had argued that the buyers had authorised and not 
prescribed writing, which as discussed above would mean that other ways of 
communicating the acceptance would be acceptable, their decision would have been 
justified. In such a case a reasonable interpretation would have been that the letters 
and acceptance of deposits, and the requests and receipts of guarantees constituted 
the sellers' communication of their acceptance in an acceptable manner other than 
the preferred manner. This would have then justified the court's decision to invoke 
the doctrine and thus its ratio decidendi, as the sellers would be said to have 
misrepresented their actual intention, which would have led the buyers reasonably, 
to believe that a contract had come into existence. 
 
Based on the principle articulated in the cases discussed, the sellers were correct to 
deny the existence of the alleged agreement on the basis that they had not validly 
accepted the buyers' offers. Consequently, if it had interpreted "prescribed' correctly, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in Pillay v Shaik should have dismissed the buyers' 
claim as was done in the case of Laws v Rutherfurd, and held that no agreement had 
come into existence because there had been no valid acceptance. It should not have 
ventured into the inquiry on the applicability of the doctrine.  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Pillay v Shaik extended the application of the 
doctrine to the form, and it is submitted that this extension was incorrect and 
                                                          
49  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
50  National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
51  Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
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unjustified. The doctrine makes sense in the case of subjective consensus but not for 
form. Because it is difficult to ascertain whether or not a party had a reservation 
mentalis, the doctrine should apply in such cases. Where it is just an issue of 
whether or not the acceptance takes the correct form, the contract assertor could 
easily ascertain it. In the case of Pillay v Shaik this was as easy as the buyers 
requesting copies of the agreement to ensure that the sellers had indeed signed and 
thus accepted the contract. The court's employment of the doctrine was, 
consequently, unnecessary. The doctrine applies by way of exception, not as the 
norm. It is meant as an aid and not as a general rule for the formation of contracts, 
as Christie seems to imply.52 
 
Had it been a case where the buyers denied the existence of the agreement on the 
basis that the sellers had not complied with the prescribed manner, the court would 
have had to agree with them. One relevant authority in this regard is the case of 
Eliason v Henshaw,53 where the offeree did not adhere to the method specified by 
the offeror and instead opted for a method which he thought would be quicker. The 
court re-affirmed the principle that a prescribed mode of acceptance must be 
observed, and held that the offeror could refuse to consider himself bound by the 
"agreement" in question, which he in fact did.54  
 
3.2.2  Incorrect application of the principle (quasi-mutual assent) to the facts of the 
case 
 
The ancillary contention relates to the court's application of the doctrine to the facts 
of the case. It is argued that the court set out the test appropriately, assigned the 
correct interpretation to the test, but incorrectly applied the test to the facts of the 
case before it. In particular, the note disputes the Supreme Court of appeal's 
application of the third leg of the test and its finding that the buyers had been misled, 
as reasonable men, to believe that a valid contract had come into being. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal held, with regards to the first leg of the test, that one of the 
sellers, who acted for himself and on behalf of the other sellers, had misrepresented 
                                                          
52  See Christie Law of Contract 11-12. 
53  Eliason v Henshaw (1819) 4 Wheaton 225. 
54  Eliason v Henshaw (1819) 4 Wheaton 225 para 28. 
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his intention.55 In applying the second leg, the court held that the representation was 
made by his agents, Mooney Ford. With regards to the application of the last leg of 
the test the court stated that the various letters sent to the buyers by Mooney Ford 
"unmistakably" led the buyers as reasonable men to believe that their offers had 
been accepted and that binding contracts had come into being. 
 
In this regard the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal is a contradiction in terms 
in that the court conceded that writing had been prescribed as the method of 
acceptance, but its judgment does not mirror this position. It also serves to reinforce 
the argument that the Supreme Court of Appeal appears to have confused 
"prescribed" with "authorised" methods of acceptance. Admittedly, where no mode of 
acceptance had been specified, or at least where writing had been authorised, the 
court's finding in favour of the buyers would have been correct for the reasons 
already discussed. In this case, however, the decision was wrong because writing 
had been prescribed by the buyers themselves. According to the last leg of the test, 
it is not enough that the contract-assertor relied on an impression created by the 
conduct of the other party – the contract-denier. Such a party must also allege and 
prove that his reliance was reasonable in the circumstances.56 In these 
circumstances courts make use of the reasonable person test and will find that such 
reliance was reasonable if a reasonable person, in the identical circumstances as 
those of the contract-assertor, would also have believed that there was subjective 
consensus. 
 
According to the Steyn v LSA Motors57 the overriding consideration seems to be if 
the reliance is reasonable when all the circumstances are taken into consideration, 
and not so much if particular, separate requirements pertaining to the parties' 
conduct have been met.58 The court in Steyn considered the conduct of both parties, 
taking into account all of the surrounding circumstances, to arrive at its finding. On 
the contrary, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Pillay v Shaik appears to have looked 
only at the fact that the sellers' conduct was misleading. The court seems to have 
                                                          
55  Pillay v Shaik 2009 4 SA 74 (SCA) para 56.  
56  See in this regard National and Overseas Distributors v Potato Board 1958 2 SA 473 (A); and 
Steyn v LSA Motors 1994 1 SA 49 (A). 
57  Steyn v LSA Motors 1994 1 SA 49 (A). 
58  Van der Merwe and Van Huyssteen 1994 SALJ 685. 
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disregarded the fact that the buyers had prescribed writing, which should have 
precluded reliance on the conduct of the sellers.  
 
A possible argument can be made, based on the contents of the letter by Mooney 
Ford to the buyers,59 that the buyers were led to believe that the sellers had signed 
the agreement, which possibly paved the way for the court to apply the doctrine. The 
implication of this would be that the sellers were rightly held liable on the basis that 
their mistake was caused by their own negligence.60 This rule is, however, subject to 
the qualification that the guilty party will be allowed to resile from the contract where 
the other party ought, as a reasonable person, to have been aware of the mistake, 
and thus cannot claim to have been reasonably misled.61 This kind of reasoning is 
nevertheless somewhat flawed in the context of the situation in Pillay v Shaik. The 
buyers, having prescribed writing, should have known that nothing but signature 
would be sufficient. It was therefore not reasonable for them to mistake any other 
conduct as signifying acceptance on the part of the sellers. As Kahn62 puts it, where 
the offeror has expressly or tacitly stipulated some other form of acceptance, there 
can be no inference of acceptance from the offeree's conduct.63 In other words, 
acceptance by conduct is limited to cases where no method of acceptance is 
stipulated. 
 
4 Proposal of an alternative approach that the Supreme Court of Appeal 
should have followed to decide the case 
 
As a prelude to this recommendation, it is important to reiterate the main submission 
in this note, which is that the Supreme Court of Appeal was wrong simply to have 
ignored the non-compliance with writing as a prescribed mode of acceptance in 
Pillay v Shaik, and to have invoked the doctrine of quasi-mutual assent. Where 
writing has been prescribed as a mode of acceptance of an offer, a valid agreement 
will come into existence only when acceptance has been effected in that manner. As 
per the principle in Laws v Rutherfurd, where a method of acceptance of an offer has 
                                                          
59  Pillay v Shaik 2009 4 SA 74 (SCA) para 29.  
60  See Brink v Humphries & Jewel (Pty) Ltd 2005 2 SA 419 (SCA) para 8. 
61  See Horty Investments (Pty) Ltd v Interior Acoustics (Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 537 (W). 
62  Kahn Contract and Mercantile Law. 
63  Kahn Contract and Mercantile Law 121. 
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been prescribed, compliance therewith can be validly circumvented only by a 
successful argument of a tacit waiver of the prescribed method. It is from this 
premise that the recommended alternative approach is made. 
 
It is submitted that had the Supreme Court of Appeal considered a tacit waiver of the 
requirement of writing – which it did not do - this would possibly have been a justified 
basis to invoke the doctrine. In other words, had the Supreme Court of appeal 
considered that the buyers had tacitly agreed to disregard writing as the basis for a 
valid formation of the contract, this would have paved a way for the Supreme Court 
of Appeal to validly invoke the doctrine and not to simply overlook or disregard the 
consequences of failure to comply with the prescribed method of acceptance. It is 
conceded that this submission could be understood as contradictory and thus 
confusing in that the judgment is criticised as wrong but appears to be saying the 
judgment may be correct after all. It should, however, be noted that tacit waiver was 
not pleaded in Pillay v Shaik, and that the proposal herein is thus an academic 
exercise. That is, the discussion centres on how the judgment could possibly have 
turned out if tacit waiver had been considered. It is to this discussion that the section 
below now turns. 
 
According to Laws v Rutherfurd,64 waiver is the deliberate abandonment, 
renunciation or surrender of an existing right by the right holder, acting in the full 
knowledge of the right. This can be done expressly or tacitly. Where the right holder 
acts contrary to an intention to enforce the right in question, then he will be said to 
have tacitly waived such a right. The person who alleges the waiver bears the onus 
to prove that the right holder, with full knowledge of his right, decided to abandon it.65 
 
It is submitted that the possible reason for the Supreme Court of Appeal's failure to 
consider waiver as a possibility resulted from the fact that the court drew a distinction 
between writing as a prescribed mode of acceptance on the one hand and writing as 
a self-imposed formality for the formation of a contract on the other hand. It based 
this distinction on an assertion that for writing to constitute a formality there must be 
                                                          
64  Laws v Rutherfurd 1924 AD 261 263. 
65  See Laws v Rutherfurd 1924 AD 261 263; and Palmer v Poulter 1983 4 SA 11 (T) 20d. 
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a preceding agreement between the parties, which it found not to have existed, 
resulting in its decision to invoke the doctrine. It seems that had the court interpreted 
writing as a formality, it would have upheld the decision of the Full Bench. This 
distinction can be criticised on two grounds, the distinction itself and the statement 
that there must always be a preceding agreement between the parties prescribing 
writing as a formality for writing to constitute a formality. 
 
Firstly, it is argued that the distinction between the two is artificial. Prescribing writing 
as a method of acceptance is the same as imposing writing as a formality, as both 
go to the validity of a contract. That is, in both cases non-compliance results in the 
contract's being void. If writing is prescribed, writing has been imposed as a formality 
because unless an offer is accepted in that manner no contract comes into 
existence.  
 
Secondly, it is argued that the formality of writing need not necessarily stem from a 
pre-existing agreement between the parties to a contract. There are at least two 
possible scenarios in which the formality of writing can arise. The first would be the 
typical scenario in Goldblatt v Fremantle, where the parties orally discuss the terms 
and agree that such terms will not be of any force or effect unless they are reduced 
to writing. This is the situation upon which the Supreme Court of Appeal made its 
distinction.  
 
The second scenario is that analogous to the Laws v Rutherfurd situation, where one 
of the parties (in most cases the offeror), without having there been any prior oral 
agreement, makes an offer in writing and therein prescribes writing as a requirement 
for formation  – a situation like that in Pillay v Shaik. It is argued that even in a case 
such as this, the requirement of writing could constitute a formality. In the case of 
Pillay v Shaik an alternative argument could be made that, because the standard 
form agreements were prepared by the sellers for interested buyers, these 
constituted offers by the sellers to potential buyers on the formalities. By signing the 
buyers were doing two things at the same time. In the first instance they were 
accepting the offer on the formalities. They were however also making an offer to the 
sellers for the purchase of the members' interest in the close corporations, which 
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would become a valid contract on signature by the sellers – a tacit agreement to 
have writing as a formality without which a valid contract cannot come into existence. 
It is upon this second situation that it is argued it was wrong for the Supreme Court 
of Appeal to find that writing did not constitute a formality. I disagree with the 
Supreme Court of Appeal's finding in this regard and instead support the finding of 
the Full Bench. 
 
The buyers having prescribed writing and it being their right to do so, would then be 
said to have tacitly and unilaterally waived this requirement. A successful argument 
on waiver would then justify the application of the doctrine on the basis that, in the 
absence of any special requirements on how the offer should be accepted, it would 
be acceptable to hold the buyers liable to the apparent contract on the basis of all 
the letters written to the buyers by the sellers through their agents. It would be a 
clear case of subjective consensus on the substance of the contract which, as has 
been argued above, is the only valid ground for the application of the doctrine.  
 
5 Conclusion 
 
It is apparent from the cases evaluated that the Supreme Court of Appeal's 
application of the doctrine in the Pillay v Shaik case was incorrect. The first line of 
cases analysed were those in which the offerors had prescribed methods of 
acceptance. The findings in all of these cases were either that the contracts were 
valid where the acceptance occurred in the prescribed manner or void where the 
acceptance took place through other methods than those prescribed. The courts did 
not have regard to any other factors but limited their inquiry simply to whether or not 
there had been compliance with the prescribed methods. This proves the contention 
that the doctrine was incorporated into our law, not to change the existing principles, 
but only as an aid to the situation discussed in the background to this note. While the 
doctrine is undoubtedly crucial, we should be careful not to over-emphasise its 
importance. It is wrong to hold, as Christie does, that no dispute on the existence of 
an agreement can properly be resolved without calling the doctrine in aid. It is 
probably this attitude or understanding that led to the Supreme Court of Appeal's 
deciding the case as it did. It is very possible for any dispute about the existence of 
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an agreement to be resolved without invoking the doctrine. Failure to adhere to any 
of the requirements for a valid contract could render an alleged agreement invalid. 
The court in such a case should and must resolve that dispute based exclusively on 
such non-compliance with the requirements. 
 
In as far as the argument that even the finding itself was wrong is concerned, it has 
been demonstrated that the Supreme Court of Appeal's application of the test for the 
doctrine was incorrect in that it found the buyers' reliance to be reasonable. Because 
the buyers prescribed the method of acceptance, their reliance upon any other factor 
would not have been reasonable.  
 
It was also stated that the decision in Pillay v Shaik undermines the principle of 
freedom of contract. It is argued that none of the reasons for undermining freedom of 
contract were applicable in the Pillay v Shaik case. The parties were more or less on 
an equal footing to bargain. Imposing formalities or prescribing a method of 
acceptance of an offer is not immoral and is not something that the parties are 
usually coerced into. The court's intervention in the Pillay v Shaik case thus cannot 
be validly justified.  
 
The conclusion drawn is that the buyers should not only have lost the case based on 
the principles of formation of contracts, but also on their failure to satisfy all of the 
requirements for the application of the test for the doctrine. 
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